We ananlyze general equilibrium e¤ects of hyperbolic discounting among unemployed workers in search equilibrium. We show that hyperbolic discounting changes the workers'trade-o¤ between high wages and a high exit rate from unemployment, thus in ‡uencing the behavior of …rms. More speci…cally, …rms 1) increase their number of vacancies, 2) reduce the quality of the vacancies (less capital per worker), and 3) reduce the wage attached to the vacancies. We discuss welfare consequences and derive policy implications. We …nd that unemployment bene…ts together with subsidized (or monitored) job search may increase welfare. If these policy measures are not availiable, minimum wages and subsidies to high-quality jobs may be warranted.
Introduction
Hyperbolic discounting is present if a person's discount rate diminishes as the time horizon increases. At any given point in time, a consumer …nds it more unattractive to delay consumption scheduled in the near future than to delay consumption scheduled in the more distant future. This leads to time-inconsistent behavior: The consumer will tend to consume more and save less than he or she would prefer from an ex-ante perspective (Frederick et al 2002) .
Hyperbolic discounting may have consequences for the behavior of unemployed workers, who face several intertemporal choices. First, a worker's choice of search intensity in ‡uences future incomes. Second, when choosing whether to accept a job o¤er, the alternative is to continue searching for a better job. Hyperbolic discounting leads to a lower search intensity and a greater tendency to accept low wage o¤ers than the person would have preferred from a prior perspective. This is discussed in a detail in DellaVigna and Paserman (2004) and Paserman (2004) .
Paserman and DellaVigna analyses job search behavior in a partial equilibrium model of job search, with an exogenous distribution of wages. In this paper we explore the equilibrium e¤ects of hyperbolic discounting in a two-sided search model with wage posting. We analyze the e¤ects of hyperbolic discounting among workers on the behavior of (non-hyperbolic) …rms. As in DellaVigna and Paserman (2004) , we …nd that hyperbolic discounting reduces worker search intensity. However, we show that this has no e¤ects on …rm behavior. More importantly therefore, hyperbolic discounting also changes the workers'trade-o¤ between high wages and a high exit rate from unemployment, and this in ‡uences …rm behavior. Speci…cally, …rms 1) increase their number of vacancies, 2) reduce the quality of the vacancies (less capital per worker), and 3) reduce the wage attached to the vacancies. We discuss welfare consequences and derive policy implications. We …nd that unemployment bene…ts together with subsidized (or monitored) job search may increase welfare. Absent these policy measures minimum wages and subsidies to high-quality jobs may be warranted.
The model
Our starting point is the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of labor market search. There exists a continuum of ex ante identical workers with measure normalized to one. Workers leave the market at an exogenous rate s. New workers enter the market as unemployed at the same rate. The unemployment rate is denoted by u. There exists a continuum of …rms in the economy. A …rm is either matched with a worker and producing or unmatched and searching for a worker. The number (measure) of searching …rms is endogenous and denoted by v.
The number of matches between searching workers and …rms is determined by a constant return to scale matching function x(eu; v). This match-ing function maps a measure of workers u who search with an average intensity e for a measure of v vacancies into a ‡ow x of new matches. Let p denote the probability rate that a worker …nds a (new) job per unit of search intensity, and q the probability rate that a …rm with a vacancy …nds a worker. The arrival rates p and q are interrelated, as both depend on the labour market tightness de…ned as v=eu. Note that p and q only depend on e through . Due to constant returns to scale, the matching function can therefore be summarized as q = q(p).
1 Matches only dissolve when the worker leaves the market, in which case the value of the …rm is zero.
Hyperbolic discounting means that the agent has a declining rate of time preference. In a continuous time, this can be obtained by assuming that the utility obtained after a certain (stochastic) period of time is discounted with a factor < 1 relative to the utility obtained at present, where "the future" arrives at a constant probability rate . Let W p and W f denote the expected discounted income for an employed worker with constant wage w evaluated at present and in the future. It follows that
where r denotes the long-term discount rate. Since
where
Note that k < 1 and that k decreases as decreases (stronger hyperbolic discounting) and when increases. In the limit, as ! 1, we …nd that k = : In the literature, this is referred to as instantaneous grati…cation, (Harris and Laibson, 2004) Let us now turn to unemployed workers. Let U p and U f denote the expected discounted income evalated at present and in the future of an unemployed worker, with job …nding rate p, wage w, and income (utility ‡ow)
where c(e) denotes the worker's search cost given search e¤ort e. Similarly, U f is given by
Note that e and p have topscript f . This is to indicate that the workers, when evaluating the future, may believe that they will behave di¤erently than today. Sophisticated agents realize that their future self also will have an hyperbolic discount rate, while naive agents do not. In what follows, we assume that the workers are sophisticated unless stated otherwise.
With endogenous worker e¤ort, the worker's choice of e¤ort is given by
It follows that we can write U p as a function of w and p, U p = U p (w; p): Firms are assumed to discount the future at a constant rate r. Thus, …rms are not subject to hyperbolic discounting. The cost of creating a vacancy is endogenous and denoted by K. The corresponding productivity when the position is …lled is given by f (K), where f (K) is increasing and concave in K. The value of a …lled vacancy is thus
Let q denote the arrival rate of workers to the vacancy. The expected discounted value of a vacancy is thus
Equilibrium
A crucial assumption in our model is that workers can direct their search intensity towards certain …rms based on the wages these …rms pay. To capture this we apply the competitive search equilibrium. This equilibrium concept can be given several interpretations. A core element of the competitive search equilibrium concept is the unique relationship between the advertised wage and the expected rate at which the vacancy will be …lled (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999b) . The relationship can be derived in several settings. Moen (1997) considers an economy in which a market maker creates submarkets, each characterized by a single wage. Workers and …rms are free to choose which submarket to enter. As shown by Moen, wage advertisements by …rms or reputation among workers about wages …rms' pay may ensure that the same equilibrium wage prevails. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999, section 4.1) and Mortensen and Wright (2002) give a similar interpretation to the one of the market maker, by assuming that a "middle man"(like a job centre) sets the wage. Alternatively, the matching technology may be derived from the urn-ball process (Montgomery (1991) , Peters (1991) , Burdett et al. (2001) ), and Shi (2001) . An intuitive explanation can be as follows. When a …rm advertises a wage, it takes into account that the workers it attracts must get the same expected income as they get if applying to any other …rm. Thus, the higher wage a …rm o¤ers, the more applicants it attracts (in expected terms). The …rm thus faces a trade-o¤ between q and w, and chooses w so as to maximize the value of V from equation (5) given this trade-o¤. In addition, free entry of …rms ensures that the value of a vacancy is equal to its creation cost. As shown in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) , the resulting equilibrium maximizes the expected income of a searching worker. In addition, we require that the …rms choose K so as to maximize V (K) K. The equilibrium values of p, w; and K are thus given by
and
We …rst derive the equilibrium in the search market for a given K, and then derive the optimal K. Let w(p; U p ) denote the indi¤erence curve of a worker with expected income U p . From equation (2) and (3) it follows that
(from the envelope theorem we know that changes in e can be ignored). It thus follows that the marginal rate of substitution between p and w is given by
Note that the marginal substitution between p and w is independent of e. With hyperbolic discounting, k < 1, while with exponential discounting, k = 1.. The next lemma is central to our analysis:
Lemma 1 Hyperbolic discounting increases the marginal rate of substitution jdw=dpj for given values of (w; p):
Proof: First note that
It is su¢ cient to show that for any > 0; U p =W p is decreasing in . However, since U p is the net present value of an income ‡ow that is backlogged, while W p denotes the net present value of an income ‡ow that is constant, it follows that the relative decrease in U p is larger than the relative decrease in W p when increases. The lemma thus follows.
To gain more intuition, note that a person with a hyperbolic discount rate puts less weight on the future than a person with exponential discounting (and the same underlying discount rate). A person with hyperbolic discounting is therefore less inclined to wait longer in order to get a higher wage than is a person with exponential discounting. The next proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 2 With hyperbolic discounting, wages are lower and the job …nding rate p is higher than with exponential discounting (given r and K).
From the lemma above, it follows that at any point (p; w) at the possibility frontier de…ned by V (w; p; K) = K, workers with hyperbolic discounting are more inclined to prefer a higher value of p in return for a lower wage. The solution to the maximization problem (6) thus implies a higher p and a lower w with hyperbolic discounting than with exponential discounting. This is illustrated in the …gure below. In the …gure, (w o ; p o ) is the equilibrium without hyperbolic discounting. At this point, the indi¤erence curve I e for a worker with exponential discounting is tangent to the zero pro…t curve V (w; p) = K. However, at this point the indi¤erence curve I h1 for a worker with hyperbolic discount rate is steeper than the zero pro…t curve. In the equilibrium point (w ; p ) it follows that the wage w is lower and the job …nding rate p is higher than in the exponential-discounting equilibrium.
Let us then turn to job quality K. The …rst order condition for K is given
independently of the workers' discounting. Since q is lower when workers have hyperbolic discounting, it follows that K is lower as well.
Proposition 3
The equilibrium job quality K is lower with hyperbolic discounting than with exponential discounting (for a given r).
As W p U p is lower with hyperbolic discounting than without, it follows that the search intensity falls as well:
Proposition 4 Search intensity is lower when workers have hyperbolic discounting than when they have exponential discounting (for a given r).
Up to now we have assumed that workers are sophisticated. Now, we assume that the workers where naive, i.e., workers believe they will act as if they had exponential discount rate in the future. We will not do the analysis in detail, only sketch the main argument. Naive workers believe they will maximize the preference of the "long-run-self" in the time intervals for which they (today) discount exponentially. This will increase the future expected discounted income of being unemployed relative to the one for sophisticated workers. This in turn leads to a lower search intensity, but higher wages and lower job …nding rates than when the agents are sophisticated:
Conjecture 5 If the workers are naive, this reduces the e¤ects of hyperbolic discounting on wages and job-…nding rates, but increases the e¤ect of hyperbolic discounting on search e¤ort.
Welfare and Policy
The proper de…nition of an optimal allocation of resources is not as clear with hyperbolic discounting as it is with exponential discounting, and there exists a literature discussing the appropriate welfare measure, see e.g. Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2004), Harris and Laibson (2004) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) . In our setting, all welfare measures will imply that the equilibrium value of p, K, and e are below their social values provided that z does not include transfers (unemployment bene…ts). In order to simplify the discussion we use as welfare measure the welfare measure the utility is the "long run self." Thus, the optimal allocation of resources is equivalent to the competitive search equilibrium with exponential discounting.
Let b denote unemployment bene…ts (transfers). With positive unemployment bene…ts the value to an unemployed worker is
We then have the following result:
Proposition 6 First best can be obtained by a combination of unemployment bene…t and subsidized search.
Proof: Denote the socially optimal values of e, p, and K by e o , p o and K o . Fix e = e o . Then we can write p = p(b), where b is the unemployment bene…t. Obviously, p = 0 as b ! 1. Thus, due to continuity it follows that there exists a b = b o such that p = p o given e = e o . Let a denote the subsidy rate for search, such that the private cost to the worker is (1 a)c(e). Choose a such that e = e o given that p = p o , and denote the corresponding a by a o . Finally, note that K = K o given that p = p o . It follows that …rst best will be achieved by implementing b = b o , a = a o . The result may be surprising, as there are three variables K, p, and w to be manipulated and only two instrument. The reason why we still get e¢ ciency is the unique relationship between w and p.
What if the only remedy is to subsidize search? Then the following still holds.
Corollary 7 It is possible to improve welfare by subsidizing search.
Without parametrizing the model it is not possible to determine the effects of an isolated increase in the unemployment bene…t b, as an increase in b even from b = 0 has …rst order e¤ects on both e and p. An increase in b decreases e, which has a negative welfare e¤ect, and decreases p which has a positive welfare e¤ect. For the same reason, one cannot predict the welfare outcome of an entry tax, as this will decrease p (a positive …rst-order welfare e¤ect) and decrease e (a negative …st-order welfare e¤ect).
Suppose the government can set minimum wages, but nothing else? The following holds:
Proposition 8 There exists a minimum wage w M in > w which improves welfare.
Increasing w marginally above its equilibrium value has a …rst-order e¤ect on p, but only second order e¤ects on K and e. The result thus follows.
Finally, note that workers actually may bene…t from being naive. Suppose e is optimally monitored by the government. Naive workers will then tend to search for jobs with a lower job-…nding rate and higher wages than sophisticated workers, thus obtaining a higher long-run utility.
More on good and bad jobs
It is straightforward to extend the model to two sectors. In each sector, each …rm employs at most one worker. Firms are price takers. Aggregate output in the economy is given by
where f is homogeneous of degree one. Let y i = f i (N 1 ; N 2 ), where N 1 and N 2 denote employment in sector 1 and 2, respectively It follows that
where y 1 and y 2 is the (real value of) output in each sector.
The vacancy costs in the two sectors are K 1 and K 2 . We assume that K 1 < K 2 . We refer to sector 2 jobs as good jobs, as they will pay higher wages in equilibrium (although workers will be indi¤erent as to which sector to enter).
Without hyperbolic discounting, it is straightforward to show that competitive search equilibrium is e¢ cient. In Moen and Rosen (2004) we show that the following holds:
Proposition 9 With hyperbolic discounting, a larger fraction of the work force is allocated to the low-wage sector (sector 1) than with exponential discounting. Furthermore, in both sectors the job …nding rates p i are higher with hyperbolic discounting than with exponential discounting.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ects of hyperbolic discounting in competitive search equilibrium where wages are determined in a competitive fashion. We …nd that hyperbolic discounting tends to reduce wages, increase the number of jobs, decrease the quality of jobs, and decrease job search intensity by workers. The allocation of resources in the economy can be improved by introducing unemployment bene…ts and subsidizing (or monitoring) search.
